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RACING TO REGULATION: A 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF 
VIRTUAL CURRENCY REGULATION 
IN ALASKA AND THE PROPOSED 




The emergence of virtual currencies has revolutionized the financial industry 
by creating an alternative form of payment that seeks to insulate individuals 
from government and bank influence. Yet, federal regulation of virtual 
currency has remained limited. Many state legislators have rushed to fill the 
gap by enacting laws regulating virtual currency use and transmission. This 
state-by-state approach has led to significant variation between state regulatory 
regimes, creating a regulatory spectrum of lenient to strict regulatory 
approaches.  In March 2017, Alaska House Representatives Zach Fansler and 
Sam Kito proposed the Alaska Money Services Act to require licensing for 
virtual currency activity. The bill’s proposed requirements lean towards the 
strict side of the regulatory spectrum, bringing the potential to drive virtual 
currency businesses away from Alaska. This Note proposes that Alaska 
legislators enact virtual currency legislation that adequately balances 
technological innovation with consumer protection through several 
recommendations, including: (1) enacting virtual currency-specific legislation 
rather than importing regulation into existing and outdated laws, (2) clearly 
defining the legislation’s scope, (3) collaborating with stakeholders in enacting 
legislation, (4) including an on-ramp to ensure emerging startups are not 
overly burdened, (5) tailoring the level of regulation to the level of risk a virtual 
currency business poses to Alaska consumers by tiering requirements to 
transmission volume, (6) requiring only relevant information in the 
application, and (7) reducing agency discretion to revoke licenses. 
 
Copyright  2018 Carlos Manzano. 
 *   J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law, 2019.  The Author would 
like to thank Professor Lawrence Baxter for his guidance in developing this note 
along with the Alaska Law review staff for their hard work and support. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Virtual currency technology has forever changed the way we think 
about money. Virtual currencies, such as bitcoin, were founded on a 
philosophy of taking power over money away from governments and 
banks and putting that power back in the hands of the people.1 These 
“cryptocurrencies” have thus emerged as alternative forms of payment 
and created a new digital medium of exchange where users can make 
financial transactions directly with one another without  intermediaries.2 
Bitcoin’s underlying blockchain technology also has the potential to 
revolutionize industries beyond the financial world.3 Other virtual 
currencies utilizing blockchain have been created4 and many more are on 
the horizon.5 
 
 1.  Jose Alvarez, Bitcoin & Libertarianism – A Dream Combination?, 
BLOCKONOMI (April 5, 2018), https://blockonomi.com/bitcoin-libertarianism/; 
see also Corin Faife, Live Free or Mine: How Libertarians Fell in Love With Bitcoin, 
COINDESK (Oct. 10, 2016, 1:19 PM), https://www.coindesk.com/live-free-or-
mine-how-libertarians-fell-in-love-with-bitcoin/ (“[Bitcoin is a chance] for the 
individual to be in complete control of his or her funds.”). 
 2.  Alexander Lipton & Alex Pentland, The Future of Money: Breaking the Bank, 
318 SCI. AM. 26, 29 (2018). 
 3.  See Don Tapscott & Rik Kirkland, How Blockchains Could Change the World, 
MCKINSEY&COMPANY (May 2016), https://www.mckinsey.com/industries 
/high-tech/our-insights/how-blockchains-could-change-the-world (describing 
blockchain as “[a]n immutable, unhackable distributed database of digital assets” 
whose “implications are staggering, not just for the financial services industry but 
also right across virtually every aspect of society”); see also DON TAPSCOTT & ALEX 
TAPSCOTT, REALIZING THE POTENTIAL OF BLOCKCHAIN: A MULTISTAKEHOLDER 
APPROACH TO THE STEWARDSHIP OF BLOCKCHAIN AND CRYPTOCURRENCIES 5 (June 
2017), http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEFRealizingPotentialBlockchain.pdf 
(stating that blockchain’s potential is beyond the financial services industry 
because the digital ledger can be programmed to record anything of value such 
as medical history, location of assets, and rights to intellectual property). 
 4.  For example, Ethereum and Cardano are two software platforms that 
have built upon Bitcoin’s blockchain technology to create “smart contracts,” 
which are self-executing contracts that automatically handle the enforcement, 
management, performance, and payment of the contract. What Is Ethereum? A 
Step-by-Step Beginners Guide, BLOCKGEEKS, https://blockgeeks.com/guides/ 
ethereum/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2018). Likewise, Ripple and its associated 
currency XRP is a more centralized cryptocurrency that is controlled by a single 
company and other financial institutions that allows for extremely fast global 
banking transactions. Jon Martindale, What is Ripple?, DIGITAL TRENDS (Jan. 18, 
2018, 12:00 PM), https://www.digitaltrends.com/computing/what-is-ripple/. 
 5.  See, e.g., Lipton & Penton, supra note 2, at 31 (discussing MIT’s Tradecoin, 
which is a blockchain based cryptocurrency anchored to physical assets to 
stabilize its price volatility). Additionally, central banks around the world are 
considering implementing their own form of state-controlled virtual currency, 
currently known as central bank digital currency (CBDC). JP Koning, A Central 
Bank Cryptocurrency? Not in 2018, COINDESK (Dec. 26, 2017, 5:30 PM), 
https://www.coindesk.com/central-bank-cryptocurrency-not-2018/. 
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Virtual currencies’ application to modern society, especially its 
underlying blockchain technology, is beginning to look less like a fad and 
more like the future.6  However, bitcoin’s price volatility7 has created a 
modern day gold rush in the cryptocurrency.8 Many speculative investors 
looking to make a quick return on their investment have flocked to invest 
in bitcoin.9 Moreover, the possibility of a “bubble” looms over this 
cryptocurrency craze.10 
Although many federal agencies have released guidance and 
opinions on virtual currency,11 Congress has yet to enact legislation 
directly regulating its use. State regulators have rushed to fill the gap.12  
 
The Federal Reserve may soon follow suit. Jeff Cox, Federal Reserve Starting to 
Think About its Own Digital Currency, Dudley Says, CNBC (Nov. 29, 2017, 10:21 
AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/11/29/federal-reserve-starting-to-think-
about-its-own-digital-currency-dudley-says.html. 
 6.  But see Lawrence Baxter, Hooray for Bitcoin (But Don’t Buy It), THE WALL 
STREET JOURNAL (Dec. 11, 2017, 6:44 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/hooray-
for-bitcoin-but-dont-buy-it-1513035892 (asserting that Bitcoin is on a “collision 
course” with government because it would “entail the elimination of central 
banks,” causing regulation that would cause investors to flee); Suzy Waite & 
Nishant Kumar, Hedge-Fund Platforms Fear Bitcoin is a Fad Like Tamagotchi, 
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 27, 2017, 11:27 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
articles/2017-11-27/remember-tamagotchi-hedge-fund-platforms-fear-bitcoin-
is-a-fad (questioning whether Bitcoin is like “Tamagotchi from 20 years ago” or 
whether it is here to stay). Jamie Dimon, CEO of JPMorgan Chase, also called 
Bitcoin a “fraud” and stated that people are “wasting [their] time” because 
“[t]here will be no currency that gets around government controls.” Robert 
Hackett, No, JPMorgan Chase CEO Jamie Dimon Has Not Changed His Stance on 
Bitcoin, FORTUNE (Jan. 9, 2018), http://fortune.com/2018/01/09/bitcoin-price-
chase-jamie-dimon/.  However, he has recognized blockchain’s potential. Id. 
 7.  Cryptocurrency Market Capitalizations: Bitcoin, COINMARKETCAP, 
https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/bitcoin/#charts (last visited Mar. 14, 
2018). 
 8.  See Yifan Yu, Despite Soaring Bitcoin Value, It’s Unclear How Many 
Millionaires Have Been Minted as a Result, PENTA, BARRON’S (Jan. 11, 2018 3:35 PM), 
https://www.barrons.com/articles/despite-soaring-bitcoin-value-its-unclear-
how-many-millionaires-have-been-minted-as-a-result-1515702929 (stating that 
23,943 addresses hold at least $1 million worth of Bitcoin). 
 9.  See Chris Burniske & Adam White, Bitcoin Investing: Where Wall Street and 
Silicon Valley Meet, COINDESK (Jan. 11, 2017 12:04 PM), 
https://www.coindesk.com/bitcoin-where-wall-street-and-silicon-valley-meet/ 
(stating that Bitcoin’s growth has increased investor interest and enthusiasm). 
 10.  Cormac Mullen, Bitcoin is Worthless, Bubble May Pop Soon, Allianz Global 
Says, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 14, 2018, 3:04 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/articles/2018-03-14/bitcoin-is-worthless-bubble-may-pop-soon-allianz-
global-says. 
 11.  See infra Section IV A and accompanying text. 
 12.  See Francine McKenna, Here’s How the U.S. and the World Regulate Bitcoin 
and Other Cryptocurrencies, MARKETWATCH (Dec. 28, 2017, 11:19 AM), 
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/heres-how-the-us-and-the-world-are-
regulating-bitcoin-and-cryptocurrency-2017-12-18 (quoting a law firm partner 
stating “[a]s the technology underpinning these developments disrupts products 
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However, states have varied widely in their regulatory approaches, 
creating a diverse regulatory spectrum.13 Some have opted for strict 
regulation, some have chosen lenient regulation, and others have chosen 
to not regulate at all.14 
This Note evaluates Alaska’s proposed Money Services Act (HB 180) 
and compares Alaska’s proposed regulatory approach to that of other 
states to determine Alaska’s location on this regulatory spectrum. Section 
II explains what bitcoin is and how it is used. Section III evaluates 
bitcoin’s asserted benefits and potential dangers. Section IV surveys the 
current regulatory spectrum both at the federal and state level, with a 
focus on regulatory approaches in New York, North Carolina, and Texas. 
Section V analyzes the proposed Alaska Money Services Act’s specific 
provisions and compares them with regulations in New York and North 
Carolina. Section VI posits alternative approaches and additional 
considerations that Alaska legislators should consider in the current 
proposed Alaska Money Services Act and all future virtual currency 
legislation. 
II. WHAT IS BITCOIN? 
A. Introduction 
Virtual currency is generally defined as “[a] digital representation of 
value that functions as a medium of exchange, a unit of account, and/or 
a store of value.”15 Bitcoin is a particular type of virtual currency, among 
many,16 that can best be explained by dividing it into its uses as a currency 
and as an investment vehicle. 
 
and services in nearly every industry, law makers, regulators, and law 
enforcement are scrambling to keep up”). 
 13.  State of Regulation 2017, Bitcoin and Blockchain Regulation in the United 
States, DINBITS (Jan. 17, 2017, 6:17 AM), https://news.dinbits.com/2017/01/state-
of-regulation-2017-bitcoin-and.html. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Notice 2014-21, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
drop/n-14-21.pdf. In reality, bitcoin has only successfully operated as a store of 
value. Bitcoin UK Team, Bitcoin: A Store of Value or a Medium of Exchange?, 
BITCOIN.CO.UK (Feb. 12, 2018), https://bitcoin.co.uk/page/bitcoin-store-value-
medium-exchange/. A lack of sufficient mainstream popularity and increasing 
miner transaction fees have diminished its use as a unit of account or medium of 
exchange. Id. 
 16.  As of the time of this writing, 1,562 different cryptocurrencies exist, with 
an estimated market cap of $337,190,851,851. Cryptocurrency Market Capitalizations: 
All Cryptocurrencies, COINMARKETCAP, https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/ 
bitcoin/#charts (last visited Mar. 14, 2018). 
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B. Bitcoin as Currency 
Bitcoin is a digital cryptocurrency that is maintained on a 
decentralized peer-to-peer payment network.17  “Decentralization” 
means that no central authority (such as a central bank) or other 
intermediary plays a role in the payment transaction; users make financial 
transactions directly with one another.18 Through the use of mathematical 
formulas and cryptography, all parties to a transaction remain 
anonymous.19 The identities of the individual parties to the transaction 
are replaced with a sequence of alphanumeric characters so that 
uncovering their true identities is extremely difficult.20 
All transactions are maintained on a distributed ledger called a 
blockchain.21 Once a transaction is initiated, it is broadcast to a peer-to-
peer network of computers to verify its validity.22 A peer-to-peer network 
is a web of computers linked so that all computers can communicate 
directly with each other without going through a central server.23 Each 
individual computer in the network is called a “node” and can be located 
anywhere in the world.24 Each node in the network individually verifies 
the transaction, including ensuring that the person transferring bitcoin 
actually has enough bitcoin to complete the transaction.25 If the nodes in 
the network agree that the transaction is valid, the transaction is packaged 
with other verified transactions into a “block.”26 
Once a block is generated, special nodes called “miners” compete 
with each other for the right to add the block to the chain.27 Miners’ 
computers attempt to solve a difficult mathematical puzzle by trial-and-
error.28 The first miner to find the answer (or “hash value”) then “mines” 
the block (adds it to the chain) and is rewarded with newly created 
bitcoin.29 This is how bitcoin is created.30 The end result is a chain of 
 
 17.  Lipton & Pentland, supra note 2, at 29. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Aaron van Wirdum, Is Bitcoin Anonymous? A Complete Beginner’s Guide, 
BITCOIN MAG. (Nov. 18, 2015, 2:34 PM), https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/is-
bitcoin-anonymous-a-complete-beginner-s-guide-1447875283/. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  John Pavlus, The Future of Money: The World Bitcoin Created, 318 SCI. AM. 
32, 33 (2018) [hereinafter Pavlus]. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. at 32. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id. at 33. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Id. 
35.2 MANZANO (DO NOT DELETE) 2/28/2019  4:19 PM 
244 ALASKA LAW REVIEW Vol. 35:2 
validated transactions grouped into blocks that is distributed to all nodes 
on the network, publicly available, and cannot be altered or hacked.31 
C. Bitcoin and Bitcoin-Based Derivatives as Investment Vehicles 
Because bitcoin is not backed by a central authority or any asset, its 
value is completely determined by supply and demand.32 As a result, its 
price often fluctuates drastically in short periods of time.33 These price 
fluctuations make bitcoin extremely speculative and volatile, causing 
many investors to invest in bitcoin and bitcoin-based derivatives for profit 
instead of as a payment alternative.34 Some investors have treated bitcoin 
as an asset or commodity, choosing to purchase bitcoin in the hopes of 
selling it later at a higher price.35 
Some investors purchase bitcoin-based derivatives, such as futures 
and options, whose value is “derived” from the underlying bitcoin 
price.36 These derivatives are thus separate financial instruments whose 
value fluctuates as the underlying bitcoin’s value fluctuates. Most 
recently, investors have funneled money into bitcoin futures.37 In the 
bitcoin futures market, two parties agree to purchase and sell a specified 
amount of bitcoin on a specific future date at a specific price.38 A key 
feature of futures and other bitcoin derivatives is that the parties do not 
have to actually own bitcoin; they can simply agree to pay the difference 
between the market price and the strike price at expiration.39 The 
 
 31.  Id. at 33–37. 
 32.  Frequently Asked Questions, BITCOIN, https://bitcoin.org/en/faq#what-
determines-bitcoins-price (last visited Mar. 15, 2018). 
 33.  See Bitcoin Price History Chart, BUY BITCOIN WORLDWIDE, 
https://www.buybitcoinworldwide.com/price/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2018) 
(showing a price fluctuation of a little under $1,000 in January 2017 to as high as 
$17,549 in December 2017); Daniel Palmer, Bitcoin’s Price Just Dropped Over $1,300 
in 1.5 Hours, COINDESK (Jan. 16, 2018), https://www.coindesk.com/bitcoins-
price-just-dropped-over-1300-in-1-5-hours/; Jennifer Bisset, Bitcoin Continues its 
Slide, Hovering Around $7K, CNET (Feb. 6, 2018, 8:37 AM), 
https://www.cnet.com/news/bitcoin-continues-its-downhill-slope-dropping-
below-7k/ (showing a loss of two-thirds of its value within two months). 
 34.  Burniske & White, supra note 9. 
 35.  See Martha C. White, Want to Invest in Bitcoin? Here’s What You Need to 
Know, MONEY (Dec. 14, 2017), http://time.com/money/5063203/how-to-invest-
in-bitcoin/ (noting that the best and simplest way to invest in Bitcoin is to set up 
a cryptocurrency wallet, purchasing Bitcoin, and trading it later). 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Chrisjan Pauw, Bitcoin Futures, Explained, COIN TELEGRAPH (Dec. 17, 2017), 
https://cointelegraph.com/explained/bitcoin-futures-explained. 
 39.  Id. 
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introduction of bitcoin futures has caused bitcoin’s price to spike 
upwards.40 
III. ASSERTED BENEFITS AND POTENTIAL DANGERS OF BITCOIN 
A. Asserted Benefits 
Bitcoin has several asserted benefits that make it attractive as an 
alternative to fiat currency.  One of bitcoin’s most touted features is its 
decentralized nature, which makes it free from government and bank 
control.41 In fact, bitcoin was created at the apex of the 2008 financial crisis, 
when trust in the ability of governments and banks to manage the 
economy and money supply was at an all-time low.42 It was founded on 
the belief that currency and the economy should be controlled by 
individuals and not by governments or banks.43 With bitcoin and other 
decentralized virtual currencies, governments cannot create currency on 
a whim or artificially manipulate its value to control the economy.44 
Instead, the supply of bitcoin is objectively determined based on a 
predetermined algorithm and is created through the mining process, 
where miners are awarded bitcoin for adding blocks to the blockchain.45 
This decentralization feature has benefited people in countries like 
Venezuela, where the government’s failure to control hyperinflation has 
caused its national currency’s value to crash. 46 In response, Venezuelans 
have exchanged their bolivars for bitcoin to preserve the value of their net 
income.47 
Additionally, because all bitcoin transactions are recorded on a 
distributed and public ledger that is constantly verified by thousands of 
 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Kevin V. Tu & Michael W. Meredith, Rethinking Virtual Currency 
Regulation in the Bitcoin Age, 90 WASH. L. REV. 271, 283 (2015). 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  See Alan Feuer, The Bitcoin Ideology, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/15/sunday-review/the-bitcoin-
ideology.html (stating that Bitcoin’s “goal is to unleash repressed economies, to 
take down global banking, [and] to wage a war against the Federal Reserve” and 
that Bitcoin attracted libertarians and anarchist groups who saw Bitcoin as “a 
means of removing the money supply from the grasping hands of governments”). 
 44.  See Tu & Meredith, supra note 41, at 284 (stating that the mining process 
“would render the currency immune from inflation and political manipulation”). 
 45.  Id. at 283–84. 
 46.  Christine Armario & Fabiola Sanchez, Venezuelans Facing Currency Crisis 
Turn to Bitcoin to Survive, THE CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Dec. 14, 2017), 
https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2017/1214/Venezuelans-
facing-currency-crisis-turn-to-bitcoin-to-survive. 
 47.  Pavlus, supra note 21, at 35. 
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miners around the world, hacking the system is almost impossible.48 
Hackers would have to gain control of over half of all nodes in the 
network, which are scattered across the globe, to take control of the 
bitcoin blockchain and add illegitimate transactions to the ledger.49 Doing 
so would be a very unlikely and unprofitable feat because the hacker 
would likely have to invest millions of dollars to sustain the attack for 
several weeks, during which time the value of the currency would 
plummet.50 
Furthermore, bitcoin payment transactions are more efficient than 
traditional financial transactions in certain respects.51 Bitcoin transactions 
are made directly from one person to another without an intermediary 
like a bank or credit card company.52 As a result, merchants can accept 
electronic payment without paying the typical two to three percent fees 
that credit card networks charge per transaction53 and users can send 
money anywhere in the world for minimal fees.54 
Bitcoin transactions also offer a great degree of privacy. Unlike 
transactions using bank accounts or other payment systems, each party’s 
personal identifying information is not revealed in a bitcoin transaction.55 
Instead, the parties’ names are replaced with a “public address,” which is 
a unique sequence of alphanumeric characters.56 However, because all 
 
 48.  Advantages and Disadvantages of Decentralized Blockchains, WORLD CRYPTO 
INDEX, https://www.worldcryptoindex.com/advantages-disadvantages-
decentralized-blockchains/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2018). However, some have 
asserted that the advent of quantum computing could make hacking the 
blockchain much easier and jeopardize the security of all cryptographic 
encryption methods. Natalie Fratto, Commentary: This New Technology Will Crack 
the Blockchain Like an Egg, FORTUNE (Jan. 31, 2018), 
http://fortune.com/2018/01/31/commentary-this-new-technology-will-crack-
the-blockchain-like-an-egg/. 
 49.  Pavlus, supra note 21, at 33. 
 50.  See Laura Shin, Should You Invest in Bitcoin? 10 Arguments Against, FORBES 
(Dec. 28, 2015, 8:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/laurashin/2015 
/12/28/should-you-invest-in-bitcoin-10-arguments-against-as-of-december-
2015/#a5ebde63895b (noting that a hacker would have to invest up to $400 
million to be able to gain control of Bitcoin’s network). 
 51.  Advantages and Disadvantages of Decentralized Blockchains, supra note 488. 
 52.  Tu & Meredith, supra note 41, at 282–83. 
 53.  Id. at 282. 
 54.  See, e.g., Carlos Terenzi, $300 Million Dollars Sent in Bitcoin for Just $0.04 
USD, USE THE BITCOIN (June 29, 2018), https://usethebitcoin.com/300-million-
dollars-sent-in-bitcoin-for-just-0-04-usd/; Joseph Young, $194 Million was Moved 
Using Bitcoin With $0.1 Fee, True Potential of Crypto, CCN (Oct. 16, 2018 11:35 PM), 
https://www.ccn.com/194-million-was-moved-using-bitcoin-with-0-1-fee-true-
potential-of-crypto/. 
 55.  Van Wirdum, supra note 19. 
 56.  What is a Bitcoin Wallet Address?, LUNO, https://www.luno.com/ 
help/en/articles/1000168404-what-is-a-bitcoin-wallet-address (last visited Mar. 
15, 2018). 
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transactions are broadcast to a public ledger, transactions are not 
completely anonymous—instead, they are considered pseudonymous.57 
If someone is able to link your personal identity to your public address, 
they can use the blockchain to track every transaction you have ever 
made.58 
While bitcoin transactions maintain individual privacy through 
cryptography, they are also very transparent. While this might seem 
counterintuitive, the bitcoin protocol is transparent because the history of 
all bitcoin transactions is publicly displayed on a ledger for all to see while 
the identities of individual parties to the transactions are kept 
pseudonymous.59 Compare this to the way banks have opaquely used 
depositor funds in the past and the resulting financial crisis of 2008.60  This 
transparency creates a degree of accountability and integrity in the 
financial system.61 
B. Potential Dangers 
Many of the features that distinguish virtual currency from 
traditional forms of payment also have downsides. For example, the 
speculative value that makes bitcoin so attractive to investors also makes 
its price too volatile to be used as a mainstream form of payment.62 It is 
untenable for a modern economy to consistently use currency that has the 
potential to fluctuate 50% in value within 24 hours.63 
Furthermore, investing in virtual currency could pose systemic 
financial risk. In fact, the Federal Reserve has issued warnings stating that 
investing in virtual currencies could pose “financial stability risks” if the 
volume of investing continues to increase at the current rate.64  Massive 
 
 57.  Van Wirdum, supra note 19. 
 58.  Bitcoin Transactions Aren’t as Anonymous as Everyone Hoped, MIT TECH. 
REV. (Aug. 23, 2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/ 
608716/bitcoin-transactions-arent-as-anonymous-as-everyone-hoped/. 
 59.  Natalie Smoleski, The Future of Money: The Evolution of Trust, SCI. AM., Jan. 
2018, at 40. 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  Blockchain Transparency Explained, LISK, https://lisk.io/academy/ 
blockchain-basics/benefits-of-blockchain/blockchain-transparency-explained 
(last visited May 1, 2018). 
 62.  See Baxter, supra note 6 (stating that Bitcoin’s value is “too volatile to be a 
reliable store of value”). 
 63.  See David Yermack, Bitcoin Lacks the Properties of a Real Currency, MIT 
TECH. REV. (Feb. 18, 2014), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/524666/ 
bitcoin-lacks-the-properties-of-a-real-currency/ (stating that bitcoin’s extreme 
volatility undermines its utility as a unit of account and store of value). 
 64.  Matthew Tompkins, US Federal Reserve Issues Bitcoin Warning, BITCOINIST 
(Dec. 3, 2017, 12:15 AM), http://bitcoinist.com/us-federal-reserve-issues-bitcoin-
warning/. 
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price fluctuations following a price increase could be signs of a bubble 
about to burst.65 Sharp price drops and other events like regulation or an 
exchange going out of business could trigger a full-scale run, leaving 
investors who have funneled thousands of dollars into bitcoin and other 
virtual currencies with nothing.66 Moreover, virtual currencies are not 
backed by Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) insurance in the 
event of a loss.67 
Additionally, the cryptography that makes parties to a payment 
transaction pseudonymous allows criminals to conduct illegal 
transactions on the dark web and accept payment in bitcoin without being 
traced.68 Criminals have offered drugs, guns, and even hitman services in 
exchange for cryptocurrency.69 For example, in 2013, the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (FBI) shut down the website Silk Road, which was an 
online black market that allowed for the purchase and sale of illicit goods 
and services with bitcoin.70 Hackers, scammers, and fraudsters have also 
demanded payment in bitcoin from their victims.71 
Finally, cybersecurity is a major concern.72 Although blockchain is 
almost un-hackable, the exchanges that store and trade bitcoin are not.73 
 
 65.  Aaron Brown, Bitcoin Has an Unusual Relationship With Volatility, 
BLOOMBERG OPINION (Nov. 19, 2017, 10:00 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com 
/view/articles/2017-11-20/bitcoin-has-an-unusual-relationship-with-
volatility#footnote-1510952499109. 
 66.  See Baxter, supra note 6 (stating that government action to regulate or bank 
virtual currency will cause Bitcoin’s price to “crash to zero,” causing “[p]anicked 
owners [to] rush to exit” and the bubble to burst); see also Preston J. Byrne, Bitcoin 
Is An Emerging Systemic Risk, COINDESK (Dec. 1, 2017, 2:00 AM), 
https://www.coindesk.com/bitcoin-emerging-systemic-risk/. 
 67.  Investor Alert: Bitcoin and Other Virtual Currency-Related Investments, U.S. 
SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N (July 29, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-
alerts-bulletins/investoralertsia_bitcoin.html. 
 68.  Baxter, supra note 6. 
 69.  Miles Goslett & Nick Pritchard, Bitcoining It In: Criminals Are Cashing In 
On Bitcoins For Illegal Activity From Buying Drugs, Hiring Hitmen and Forging 
Passports on the Dark Web, THE SUN (Dec. 8, 2017, 2:03 AM), 
https://www.thesun.co.uk/tech/5092224/criminals-use-bitcoin-for-dark-web-
illegal-activity/. 
 70.  Jessica Roy, Everything You Need to Know About Silk Road, the Online Black 
Market Raided by the FBI, TIME (Oct. 4, 2013), http://nation.time.com/2013 
/10/04/a-simple-guide-to-silk-road-the-online-black-market-raided-by-the-fbi/. 
 71.  Frederick Coleman, The Dark Side of Bitcoin: Illegal Activities, Fraud, and 
Bitcoin, BLOCKONOMICS (June 16, 2017), https://blog.blockonomics.co/the-dark-
side-of-bitcoin-illegal-activities-fraud-and-bitcoin-360e83408a32. 
 72.  Sean Williams, 4 Reasons I’ll Never Invest in Bitcoin (and You Shouldn’t 
Either), THE MOTLEY FOOL (June 14, 2017, 7:32 AM), https://www.fool.com/ 
investing/2017/06/14/4-reasons-why-ill-never-invest-in-bitcoin-and-you.aspx. 
 73.  See Frances Coppola, Yet Another Theft From a Cryptocurrency Exchange – 
But Who Is Really To Blame, FORBES (Feb. 11, 2018, 12:40 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/francescoppola/2018/02/11/yet-another-theft-
from-a-cryptocurrency-exchange-but-who-is-really-to-blame/#7ceaf112f6dd 
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For example, in 2014, an estimated $460 million worth of bitcoin was 
stolen from Mt. Gox, the largest virtual currency exchange at the time.74 
More recently, $530 million of a lesser-known virtual currency called 
NEM disappeared from an exchange in Japan.75 These cyber-thefts are just 
some of many taking place around the world.76 Due to the pseudonymity 
and permanency of transactions on the blockchain, recovery of stolen 
coins is almost impossible.77 
IV. THE REGULATORY SPECTRUM 
A. Federal Regulation 
As of the time of this writing, Congress has not enacted legislation 
directly regulating virtual currency.78 However, several House and 
Senate committees have held hearings to investigate cryptocurrencies, 
signaling that federal legislation regulating virtual currency may be on 
the horizon.79 During these hearings, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(CFTC) have stated that they are coordinating with the Treasury 
Department and the Federal Reserve to better understand virtual 
currency and may ask Congress to pass additional legislation.80 For now, 
 
(noting that virtual currency is only as secure as the exchange’s security, which is 
not necessarily secure). 
 74.  Robert McMillan, The Inside Story of Mt. Gox, Bitcoin’s $460 Million Disaster, 
WIRED (Mar. 3, 2014, 6:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2014/03/bitcoin-
exchange/. 
 75.  Daniel Shane, $530 Million Cryptocurrency Heist May Be Biggest Ever, 
CNNTECH (Jan. 29, 2018, 11:55 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2018/01/29/ 
technology/coincheck-cryptocurrency-exchange-hack-japan/index.html. 
 76.  See id. (noting smaller thefts that have occurred in South Korea and 
Slovenia). 
 77.  Greg Rynerson, Surety Bond for Cryptocurrency: How It Works and Which 
States Are Requiring It, LINKEDIN (Nov. 27, 2017), https://www.linkedin.com/ 
pulse/surety-bond-cryptocurrency-how-works-which-states-greg-rynerson-
cpcu/. 
 78.  Tony Romm, Bitcoin Could Face New Regulations in the U.S. After Top 
Financial Cops and Lawmakers Raise New Fears About Virtual Currency, RECODE (Feb. 
6, 2018, 1:48 PM), https://www.recode.net/2018/2/6/16979498/bitcoin-
regulation-sec-cftc-congress. 
 79.  Id.; Kate Rooney, Congressional Hearing on Cryptocurrencies Devolves into 
Bitcoin Bash Fest, CNBC (Mar. 14, 2018, 4:49 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/ 
2018/03/14/congressional-hearing-devolves-into-bitcoin-bash-fest.html. More 
recently, Congress has introduced three bills that would regulate 
cryptocurrencies. Jimmy Aki, U.S. Congressman Drafts Blockchain Development Bills, 
BITCOIN MAG. (Sept. 22, 2018 11:09 AM), https://bitcoinmagazine.com/ 
articles/us-congressman-drafts-blockchain-development-bills/. 
 80.  Michelle Price & Pete Schroeder, U.S. Regulators May Ask Congress for 
Virtual Currency Legislation, REUTERS (Feb. 6, 2018, 1:06 AM), 
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federal virtual currency regulation is limited to guidance and opinions 
from administrative agencies. 
In 2013, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) issued 
guidance stating that individuals who use virtual currency to purchase 
goods and services are not a “money services business” under the Bank 
Secrecy Act, and therefore are not subject to FinCEN oversight.81 
However, exchanges and payment processors are money transmitters 
under the guidance and are subject to registration, reporting, and 
recordkeeping regulations.82 In 2014, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
classified bitcoin as property and not currency for federal tax purposes.83 
Thus, capital gains taxes apply to virtual currency sales and exchanges.84 
In 2015, the CFTC designated bitcoin and all other virtual currencies 
as commodities, subjecting virtual currency futures and options to CFTC 
oversight.85 As of December 2017, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange and 
Cboe Futures Exchange (CFE) self-certified bitcoin futures and the Cantor 
Exchange self-certified bitcoin binary options.86 
Due to the “gold rush” in virtual currency, many companies have 
begun issuing their own virtual currency to raise capital.87 Through these 
initial coin offerings (ICOs), a company creates a new virtual currency (a 
“token”) and offers it to investors in exchange for a mainstream 
cryptocurrency (like bitcoin or Ether) or cash.88 The SEC has stated that 
certain tokens may be considered securities within SEC jurisdiction, 




 81.  DEP’T OF THE TREASURY FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, FIN-2013-G001, 
APPLICATION OF FINCEN’S REGULATIONS TO PERSONS ADMINISTERING, EXCHANGING, 
OR USING VIRTUAL CURRENCIES (2013), https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default 
/files/shared/FIN-2013-G001.pdf. 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  I.R.S., Notice 2014-21, 2, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-14-
21.pdf. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Justin O’Connell, CFTC: Bitcoin is a Commodity, CCN (Sept. 18, 2015, 8:56 
AM), https://www.ccn.com/cftc-bitcoin-commodity/. 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  What is an Initial Coin Offering? Raising Millions in Seconds, BLOCKGEEKS, 
https://blockgeeks.com/guides/initial-coin-offering/ (last visited May 3, 2018). 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  See SEC Chairman Jay Clayton, Public Statement: Statement on 
Cryptocurrencies and Initial Coin Offerings, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N (Dec. 11, 
2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/ 
statement-clayton-2017-12-11 (stating that the answer to whether an offering is 
legal depends on many factors); see also SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, RELEASE NO. 
81207, REPORT OF INVESTIGATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 21(A) OF THE SECURITIES 
EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934: THE DAO (2017) (“[T]he Commission deems it 
appropriate and in the public interest to issue this Report in order to stress that 
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that all ICOs he had seen to date were securities.90 However, as of the time 
of this writing, no ICO has been registered with the SEC,91 although one 
has recently been filed and is pending SEC approval.92  The SEC has also 
denied all requests from Wall Street to approve Exchange Traded Funds 
(ETFs) for virtual currencies,93 citing “significant investor protection 
issues” and the difficulty of valuing cryptocurrencies on a daily basis (as 
required for ETFs) due to their price volatility.94 The SEC has also issued 
warnings to potential virtual currency investors, warning that investors 
are substantially less protected when investing in virtual currency as 
compared to traditional securities.95 
B. State Regulation 
With no federal legislation directly regulating virtual currency, state 
regulators have enacted regulations to fill in the gap.96 State approaches 
to regulation vary widely.97 Some states have shoehorned virtual 
currency regulation into their existing money transmission laws, while 
others have enacted new legislation specifically tailored to virtual 
currency.98 Some legislatures have left virtual currency activities within 
their states unregulated.99 The result has been an erratic regulatory 
spectrum, with some states opting for strict regulation and other states 
 
the U.S. federal securities law may apply to various activities, including 
distributed ledger technology, depending on the particular facts and 
circumstances.”). 
 90.  Stan Higgins, SEC Chief Clayton: ‘Every ICO I’ve Seen Is a Security’, 
COINDESK (Feb. 6, 2018, 7:30 PM), https://www.coindesk.com/sec-chief-clayton-
every-ico-ive-seen-security/. 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  Renaissance Capital, Here’s a First: The Praetorian Group Files $75 Million 
ICO with the SEC, NASDAQ (Mar. 7, 2018 3:13 AM), https://www.nasdaq.com/ 
article/heres-a-first-the-praetorian-group-files-75-million-ico-with-the-sec-
cm931057. 
 93.  See, e.g., Jen Wieczner, What the SEC Bitcoin ETF Decision Means for the 
Future of Cryptocurrency, FORTUNE (Mar. 10, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/ 
03/10/bitcoin-price-etf-winklevoss-approval/; David Meyer, Cryptocurrency 
ETFs Are Off the Table for Now, the SEC Says, FORTUNE (Jan. 19, 2018), 
http://fortune.com/2018/01/19/sec-cryptocurrency-etfs-bitcoin/. 
 94.  SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, STAFF LETTER: ENGAGING ON FUND INNOVATION 
AND CRYPTOCURRENCY-RELATED HOLDINGS (2018), https://www.sec.gov/ 
divisions/investment/noaction/2018/cryptocurrency-011818.htm. 
 95.  SEC Chairman Jay Clayton, supra note 89. 
 96.  See McKenna, supra note 12 (describing recent state regulatory activity). 
 97.  See Tu & Meredith, supra note 41, at 305 (“[T]he regulatory landscape in 
the United States evidences a number of differing approaches to clarifying the 
regulatory requirements applicable to virtual currencies. . . .”). 
 98.  Id. at 306–13. 
 99.  Id. at 308. 
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opting for lenient or no regulation. This section will survey three states at 
different points on the regulatory spectrum. 
1. New York 
In June 2015, the New York Department of Financial Services 
(NYDFS) promulgated a rule specifically regulating virtual currency that 
was separate from New York’s existing money transmission laws.100 This 
was the first state regulatory regime imposed specifically on virtual 
currencies.101 Its requirements are stringent but vague. 
The rule requires that any person engaged in any “virtual currency 
business activity” obtain a license,102 which has become notoriously 
known as the “BitLicense.”103 “Virtual currency business activity” is 
broadly defined to include transmitting, storing, holding, maintaining 
custody or control, buying and selling, or administering virtual currency, 
as well as performing “Exchange Services.”104 Merchants and consumers 
who only use virtual currency to buy or sell goods or services or for 
investment purposes are explicitly exempt from the BitLicense 
requirement.105 Likewise, bitcoin miners are exempt from the BitLicense 
requirement because they are not “administering” bitcoin.106 The 
ambiguity of the rule’s language has created uncertainty as to which 
businesses are engaging in “virtual currency business activity” and are 
required to obtain a BitLicense.107 The FAQs on NYDFS’s website are just 
 
 100.  N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, § 200 (2015). 
 101.  Peter Luce et al., New York Becomes First State to Propose Virtual Currency 
Regulations, PAYMENT LAW ADVISOR (Aug. 13, 2014), https://www.paymentlaw 
advisor.com/2014/08/13/new-york-becomes-first-state-to-propose-virtual-
currency-regulations/. 
 102.  Section 200.3(a). 
 103.  Daniel Roberts, New York’s Bitcoin Business Policy Has Arrived, FORTUNE 
(Jun. 5, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/06/05/new-york-bitcoin-business-
policy/. 
 104.  Section 200.2(q). 
 105.  Section 200.3(c)(2). 
 106.  See Nermin Hajdarbegovic, Lawsky: Bitcoin Developers and Miners Exempt 
from BitLicense, COINDESK (May 18, 2015, 4:16 PM), https://www.coindesk.com 
/lawsky-bitcoin-developers-miners-exempt-bitlicense/( recognizing this 
reasoning is consistent with FinCEN’s stance on bitcoin miners). See also DEP’T OF 
THE TREASURY FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, FIN-2014-R001, APPLICATION OF 
FINCEN’S REGULATIONS TO VIRTUAL CURRENCY MINING OPERATIONS (2014), 
https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/FIN-2014-R001.pdf 
(stating that Bitcoin miners are not administrators because mining “imposes no 
obligations on a Bitcoin user to send mined Bitcoin to any other person or place 
for the benefit of another”). 
 107.  Sarah Brennan, Contortions for Compliance: Life Under New York’s BitLicense, 
COINDESK (Jan. 22, 2018, 8:01 AM), https://www.coindesk.com/contortions-
compliance-life-new-yorks-bitlicense/. 
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as vague and unhelpful in guiding companies that are trying to determine 
whether they fall within NYDFS’s purview.108 
Furthermore, the rule contains extremely burdensome application 
requirements. Under the rule, the applicant and each “Principal Officer, 
Principal Stockholder, and Principal Beneficiary” must provide detailed 
biographical information about themselves109 and must submit a 
background check prepared by an independent investigatory agency.110 
Additionally each “Principal Officer, Principal Stockholder, and Principal 
Beneficiary” and “[a]ll individuals to be employed by the applicant who 
have access to any customer funds” must provide fingerprints and 
photographs of themselves.111 Applicants must also pay a $5000 non-
refundable application fee112 and draft and submit policies and 
procedures to ensure compliance with the rule’s requirements before 
obtaining a license.113 
Further, the superintendent has broad discretion in setting various 
licensing requirements. The licensee must maintain a surety bond, the 
amount of which is up to the superintendent’s discretion.114 No maximum 
is set on the amount of the surety bond. Any “material change” to the 
business must be approved by the superintendent prior to 
implementation.115 The term “material change” is very broadly defined.116 
Changes of control must also be approved.117 
Licensees must also submit quarterly financial statements and 
audited annual financial statements,118 as well as maintain an anti-money 
laundering program119 and cybersecurity program.120 Even if a business 
receives a license and can meet all of its requirements, the superintendent 
 
 108.  See BitLicense Frequently Asked Questions, N.Y. STATE DEPT. OF FIN. SERV., 
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/legal/regulations/bitlicense_reg_framework_faq.htm 
(last visited Nov. 15, 2018) (merely restating the statutory language and 
responding to the FAQs with simples yes or no answers and restating the 
questions). 
 109.  Section 200.4(a)(3) 
 110.  Section 200.4(a)(4) 
 111.  Section 200.4(a)(5) (emphasis added). 
 112.  Section 200.5. 
 113.  Section 200.4(a)(10). 
 114.  Section 200.9. 
 115.  Section 200.10. 
 116.  Id. (broadly defining “material change” to include any proposed change 
that may raise a “legal or regulatory issue” about the activity or product, any 
proposed change that may raise “safety and soundness or operational concerns,” 
and any proposed change that may make the business’ product, service, or 
activity “materially different” than previously listed on the license application). 
 117.  Section 200.11. 
 118.  Section 200.14. 
 119.  Section 200.15. 
 120.  Section 200.16. 
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can revoke a BitLicense “for good cause.”121 “Good cause” is shown 
merely when the licensee “has defaulted or is likely to default in performing 
its obligations . . . .”122 This grants the superintendent broad authority to 
revoke licenses. 
New York’s infamous BitLicense regime clearly falls on the strict side 
of the regulatory spectrum. Its sweeping definition of “virtual currency 
business activity” subjects a broad range of businesses to the state’s 
demanding licensure requirements. The BitLicense has had a profound 
impact on the virtual currency industry and created significant barriers to 
entry for start-up businesses due to its compliance costs and burdensome 
requirements.123 As of June 2018, only nine companies have received a 
BitLicense.124 Virtual currency businesses have fled New York to avoid its 
prohibitively expensive regulatory requirements.125 
2. North Carolina 
In 2016, North Carolina amended its existing money transmission 
laws to cover virtual currency.126 Unlike New York’s BitLicense rule, 
which was adopted through agency rulemaking, North Carolina enacted 
its virtual currency regulation through legislation.127 
The statute requires a license for any person that engages in “the 
business of money transmission.”128 The definition of “money 
transmission” was amended to include “maintaining control of virtual 
currency on behalf of others.”129 This definition, although somewhat 
vague, narrows the scope of the licensure requirements and provides 
 
 121.  Section 200.6(c). 
 122.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 123.  DAVIS POLK, NEW YORK’S FINAL “BITLICENSE” RULE: OVERVIEW AND 
CHANGES FROM JULY 2014 PROPOSAL 3, 3 (2015), https://www.davispolk.com 
/files/2015-06-05_New_Yorks_Final_BitLicense_Rule.pdf (describing BitLicense 
application requirements). 
 124.  DFS Grants Virtual Currency License to Square, N.Y. ST. DEP’T OF FIN. SERVS. 
(June 18, 2018), https://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/press/pr1806181.htm. 
 125.  See id. (“[T]he BitLicense has prompted flight from New York by larger 
players such as Bitifinex and Shapeshift and has had a chilling effect on others 
acting in an abundance of caution.”); see also Localbitcoins.com Joins Exodus, 
Discontinues Services to New York Over BitLicense, DINBITS (Aug. 12, 2015, 3:18 AM), 
https://news.dinbits.com/2015/08/localbitcoincom-joins-exodus.html?m=1 
(“Companies of all sizes have been marching out of New York in both protest and 
self-survival.”). 
 126.  North Carolina Money Transmitters Act, 2015 N.C. Sess. Law 2016-81, 
2016 N.C. Sess. Laws 242 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 53-208.41–
64 (2016)). 
 127.  Pete Rizzo, North Carolina Governor Signs Bitcoin Bill Into Law, COINDESK 
(July 6, 2016, 8:05 PM), https://www.coindesk.com/north-carolina-governor-
signs-bitcoin-bill-law/. 
 128.  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-208.43 (2016). 
 129.  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-208.42(13) (2016). 
35.2 MANZANO (DO NOT DELETE) 2/28/2019  4:19 PM 
2018 RACING TO REGULATION 255 
more clarity as to which businesses are required to obtain a money 
transmission license.130 The statute explicitly provides various 
exemptions for virtual currency131 and excludes miners and software 
companies implementing blockchain technology.132 
North Carolina’s initial application process is not as burdensome as 
New York’s. Unlike New York’s intrusive informational requirements,133 
“control persons” only need to provide minimal information: name, 
address, and five year employment history.134  The definition of “control” 
is narrow and includes only those who can “direct the management or 
policy of the licensee.”135 
Additionally, many of the statute’s licensure requirements are 
tailored specifically to the particular entity being regulated. For example, 
the application requires a non-refundable application fee of $1500 plus an 
annual fee that is based on the transmission volumes of the business.136 
The annual fee begins at $5000 a year and increases as the transmission 
volume exceeds $1,000,000, and can result in substantial fees.137 Likewise, 
the statute’s surety bond requirement has five tiers which are also based 
on transmission volume.138 The maximum amount for the surety bond is 
$250,000.139 The surety bond requirement remains in effect for no less than 
five years after the licensee has stopped operating in the state.140 
However, some of the statute’s licensure requirements are relatively 
stringent. Businesses seeking a license must have a net worth of at least 
$250,000 to qualify.141 This net worth requirement is relatively high, 
although some states’ requirements are as high as $500,000 and 
$1,000,000.142 Like New York’s BitLicense regime, the North Carolina 
regime requires businesses to provide audited annual financial 
statements and quarterly reports143 and policies and procedures such as 
 
 130.  See Lester Coleman, North Carolina Governor Signs Bitcoin-Friendly ‘Virtual 
Currency Law’, CCN (July 8, 2016, 3:23 PM), https://www.ccn.com/north-
carolina-bitcoin-law-signed/ (“The North Carolina action contrasts with New 
York State’s separate licensing regime.”). 
 131.  Section 53-208.44. 
 132.  Coleman, supra note 130. 
 133.  See supra notes 109–11 and accompanying text. 
 134.  Section 53-208.44. 
 135.  Section 53-208.42(5) (emphasis added). 
 136.  Section 53-208.49. 
 137.  Id. 
 138.  Section 53-208.47. 
 139.  Section 53-208.47(b). 
 140.  Section 53-208.47(h). 
 141.  Section 53-208.46. 
 142.  Ashley Grimes, Money Transmitter Licensing, GRIMES LAW PLLC, 
http://www.grimeslawaz.com/money-transmitter-licensing/#_ftn4 (last visited 
Mar. 18, 2018). 
 143.  Section 53-208.53. 
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an anti-money laundering compliance program.144  Additionally, all 
changes in control and material events must be reported within fifteen 
days,145 but do not require prior approval, as in New York. The North 
Carolina Commissioner also has broad discretion to revoke a license if the 
licensee “has conducted business in an unsafe or unsound manner.”146 
North Carolina’s licensure requirements put the state around the 
middle of the regulatory spectrum. North Carolina’s limited application 
requirements and transmission-volume-specific annual and surety bond 
requirements ensure that start-ups are not overly burdened. However, 
North Carolina’s net worth requirements and the Commissioner’s wide 
discretion to revoke licenses are less business-friendly. Overall, the 
statute has been touted as a thoughtful, bitcoin-friendly approach to 
virtual currency regulation that encourages companies to return to the 
state and use virtual currency and blockchain technology.147 
3. Texas 
Texas falls on the lenient end of the regulatory spectrum. Texas has 
not enacted any virtual currency legislation or regulation. Instead, the 
Texas Department of Banking has released guidance explicitly excluding 
virtual currency activities from money transmission licensing 
requirements.148 The Department has stated that virtual currency is not 
“money” under the Texas Money Services Act, and therefore virtual 
currency activities are not “money transmission.”149 The state has been 
touted as “an ideal state for Bitcoin mining and Blockchain marketing” 
and “great for any future and existing bitcoin enterprise.”150 However, the 
Texas Securities Board has begun to issue cease and desist orders on coin 
offerings where virtual currency is being offered as a security,151 signaling 
 
 144.  Section 53-208.45(a)(8). 
 145.  Section 53-208.54. 
 146.  Section 53-208.56(2)(f). 
 147.  See Coleman, supra note 130 (“North Carolina anticipated key issues, and 
developed a reasonable solution to address each concern.”). 
 148.  TEX. DEP’T OF BANKING, SUPERVISORY MEMORANDUM – 1037, REGULATORY 
TREATMENT OF VIRTUAL CURRENCIES UNDER THE TEXAS MONEY SERVICES ACT, 3 
(2014) (stating that virtual currency is not money under the Texas Money Services 
Act, and therefore virtual currency activities are not money transmission). 
 149.  Id. 
 150.  Iyke Aru, Texas is the Ideal State to Work with Bitcoin and Blockchain, COIN 
TELEGRAPH (Dec. 17, 2015), https://cointelegraph.com/news/texas-is-the-ideal-
state-to-work-with-bitcoin-and-blockchain. 
 151.  See, e.g, $4 Billion Crypto-Promoter Ordered to Halt Fraudulent Sales, TEX. 
STATE SEC. BD. (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.ssb.texas.gov/news-publications/4-
billion-crypto-promoter-ordered-halt-fraudulent-sales (explaining that the 
investments offered by the promoter were securities, but were not registered as 
such as required in Texas); see also Dan Zehr, After Bitcoin Surges, Texas Regulators 
Start to Scrutinize Virtual Currency Offers, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN: 512 TECH 
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a potential change in the state’s outlook on virtual currency regulation at 
the agency level. 
V. ALASKA MONEY SERVICES ACT – HB 180 
In March 2017, Alaska House Representatives Zach Fansler and Sam 
Kito introduced the Alaska Money Services Act to regulate virtual 
currency activities within the state.152 Under Alaska’s current Uniform 
Money Services Act, a person cannot engage in the business of money 
transmission or currency exchange unless the person has a money 
transmission license153 or currency exchange license.154 HB 180 would 
modernize and amend Alaska’s existing Uniform Money Services Act by 
defining virtual currency and requiring a money transmission license for 
businesses engaged in virtual currency activities.155 In proposing the bill, 
legislators recognized that the advent of different forms of virtual 
currency have changed the money services business industry.156 
Legislators also recognized the need to hold money services businesses 
accountable and protect consumers.157 
HB 180 would amend the definition of “money transmission” to 
include conduct such as transmitting, securing and storing, buying and 
selling, exchanging, controlling, and issuing virtual currency.158 This 
broad definition mimics New York’s “virtual currency business activity” 
definition. As with New York’s BitLicense, it is unclear which businesses 
would be required to obtain a license in Alaska. It is also unclear whether 
Alaska will follow New York’s lead and exclude bitcoin miners from the 
legislation’s scope. 
HB 180’s application process has a mixture of strict and lenient 
elements. Application fees for a license would only be $1000.159 This fee is 
 
(Jan. 10, 2018), https://www.512tech.com/technology/after-bitcoin-surges-
texas-regulators-start-scrutinize-virtual-currency-offers/hNPRUhbrAQg 
QQCHJyXxfPM/ (explaining that securities regulators are “keeping an eye out 
for offerings that go beyond the mere introduction of a new currency and begin 
to look like traditional securities like stocks or bonds”). 
 152.  H.B. 180, 30th Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 2017). On January 31, 2018, HB 180 
was referred to the Alaska House Judiciary Committee. As of this writing, no 
further action has been taken and the future of HB 180 is uncertain. 
 153.  ALASKA STAT. § 06.55.101(a)(1) (2016). 
 154.  Section 06.55.201(a)(1)–(2). 
 155.  Alaska H.B. 180. 
 156.  Rep. Zach Fansler, Sponsor Statement: House Bill 180 Alaska Money Services 
Act, ALASKA STATE LEGISLATURE, http://www.akleg.gov/basis/get Documents 
.asp?session=30&docid=38532 (last visited Mar. 31, 2018). 
 157.  Id. 
 158.  Alaska H.B. 180 § 58. 
 159.  Alaska Money Transmission/Currency Exchange Application, ALASKA DEP’T 
OF COMMERCE, CMTY, AND ECON. DEV. – DIV. OF BANKING AND SECURITIES (Sept. 
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modest compared to New York’s $5000 non-refundable fee and even 
lower than North Carolina’s $1500 fee. As in North Carolina, licensure in 
Alaska would also require an annual assessment fee, the amount to be 
determined by the Alaska Department of Commerce through 
regulation.160 When determining the business’s qualifications, the 
Department would be able to conduct an investigation of the business 
with the applicant paying for reasonable costs.161 The application would 
also require that each “control person” provide fingerprints.162 HB 180 
would expand the definition of “control” to include “the power to 
exercise, directly or indirectly, an influence over the management or 
policies of” the licensee.163 The current definition specifies only “a 
controlling influence over the management or policies” of the licensee. 
Removing the word “controlling” from the definition of control would 
expand the scope of individuals considered “control persons.”164 
HB 180 would amend the current statute’s licensure requirements to 
be more stringent. The bill would repeal the state’s current net worth 
requirement of $25,000165 and impose a surety bond requirement of at 
least $25,000 and as high as $1 million, up from a maximum of $125,000.166 
The Department would have discretion over the surety bond amount 
required167 based on “the risk presented by the licensee’s business model 
and focus.”168 The purpose of the surety bond would be to allow both 
private litigants and the Department to file an action against the bond.169 
The licensee would be required to pay the premiums to cover claims 
while providing money services in Alaska and for at least 5 years after the 
applicant has stopped providing such services.170 
As in North Carolina and New York, HB 180 would require that all 
changes in control be approved by the Department and would require a 




 160.  Alaska H.B. 180 § 13. 
 161.  Alaska H.B. 180 § 8. 
 162.  Alaska H.B. 180 § 3(3). 
 163.  Alaska H.B. 180 § 56(3). 
 164.  ALASKA STAT. § 06.55.990(3)(C) (2016) (emphasis added). 
 165.  Alaska H.B. 180 § 69 (repealing ALASKA STAT. § 06.55.107 (2016)). 
 166.  Alaska H.B. 180 § 4(a). 
 167.  Id. 
 168.  House Labor and Commerce Comm., Alaska Money Services Act HB 180 
(May 2017), http://www.akleg.gov/basis/get_documents.asp?session=30& 
docid=38534. 
 169.  Rep. Zach Fansler, House Bill 180-A Alaska Money Services Act Brief 
Sectional Analysis, http://www.akleg.gov/basis/get_documents.asp?session 
=30&docid=38535. 
 170.  Alaska H.B. 180 § 6. 
 171.  Alaska H.B. 180 § 31. 
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would also implement a new requirement of an “annual report” and the 
Department would have discretion over the report’s requirements.172 If 
the annual report requires audited financial statements, like those 
required in New York and North Carolina, the burden of generating this 
report would increase dramatically.173 
Finally, HB 180 would grant the Department very broad discretion 
to revoke a business’s license. The Department would be able to revoke a 
license if the licensee engages in an “unsafe or unsound practice.”174 HB 
180 defines an “unsafe or unsound practice” as conduct that “creates the 
likelihood of material loss, insolvency, or dissipation of the . . . licensee’s 
assets, or otherwise materially prejudices the interests of the . . . licensee’s 
customers.”175 However, in determining whether the licensee is engaged 
in an “unsafe or unsound practice,” HB 180 would allow the Department 
to consider both the “magnitude of loss or potential loss.”176 Such broad 
discretion that allows the Department to take into consideration 
“potential loss” might allow regulators to revoke licenses if a virtual 
currency’s value drops quickly, which is a common event among virtual 
currencies. This discretion could lead to a great deal of uncertainty among 
licensees who are unsure whether their conduct could potentially cause 
loss.177 
HB 180 reflects the proposing legislators’ perception that virtual 
currency is extremely risky. The bill’s passage would place the state 
clearly on the strict side of the regulatory spectrum, very close to New 
York. Its vague scope, increased surety bond amount, annual assessment 
fees, and annual report requirement may impose large costs on many 
start-ups, thus stifling innovation. Furthermore, the Department’s broad 
discretion to revoke licenses would add uncertainty to an already 
uncertain business. Even well-established virtual currency businesses 
may feel that the regulatory costs of serving Alaska’s residents are 
unjustified based on Alaska’s small population, causing them to deny 
 
 172.  Alaska H.B. 180 § 13. 
 173.  2017 Audit Fee Survey Report, FIN. EXECUTIVES RESEARCH FOUND., 
https://www.workiva.com/sites/workiva/files/pdfs/thought-leadership/fei-
audit-fee-2017-report-final.pdf (last visited Mar. 18, 2018) (explaining that audited 
financial statements can be extremely expensive, averaging around $163,000 for 
private companies in 2016). 
 174.  ALASKA STAT. § 06.55.601(6) (2016). 
 175.  Section 06.55.990(24). 
 176.  Alaska H.B. 180 § 40 (emphasis added). 
 177.  See PETER VAN VALKENBURGH & JERRY BRITO, STATE DIGITAL CURRENCY 
PRINCIPLES AND FRAMEWORK, 25 (2017), https://coincenter.org/files/2017-
03/statevirtualcurrencyprinciplesandframeworkv2.0.pdf (“Discretion also 
generates regulatory uncertainty: a person never knows whether conduct she has 
freely engaged in before will suddenly become punishable simply because a 
government official changed her mind.”). 
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Alaska residents access to its services. Thus, Alaska’s position on the strict 
side of the regulatory spectrum could preclude its residents from enjoying 
many of the benefits offered by virtual currencies. 
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE LEGISLATION 
With virtual currency technology advancing so quickly, legislators 
have the difficult task of evaluating the risks of evolving technology while 
considering the benefits that such technology provides to constituents 
and businesses. Ideally, these benefits and risks should be balanced to 
ensure that emerging businesses are able to thrive and consumers are 
adequately protected. Regulation should be well-reasoned and not hastily 
enacted. This is a tall order. The remainder of this Note will posit 
recommendations to the Alaska Legislature for all future virtual currency 
legislation to ensure that these competing interests are accounted for and 
adequately balanced. 
A. Enact Virtual Currency Specific Legislation 
As previously mentioned, various states, including Alaska, have 
chosen to regulate virtual currency by amending their existing money 
transmission laws.178 However, many of these laws are outdated and their 
frameworks were drafted to regulate traditional money remitter 
businesses such as Western Union.179 Shoehorning virtual currency 
businesses into existing regulatory frameworks designed to regulate 
traditional payment systems is unwise. 
Virtual currencies have several unique features that make them 
fundamentally different from traditional payment methods, such as their 
decentralized nature, price volatility, pseudonymity, and immutability.180 
Additionally, the entities engaging in virtual currency transmission are 
very different than traditional money remitters. Instead of amending 
existing laws, legislators should draft and enact legislation that is specific 
to virtual currency and considers all of these distinct features. This 
 
 178.  Tu & Meredith, supra note 41, at 311. 
 179.  Benjamin Lo, Note, Fatal Fragments: The Effect of Money Transmission 
Regulation on Payments Innovation, 18 YALE J.L. & TECH. 111, 120 (2016); see also 
Marco Santori, What is Money Transmission and Why Does it Matter?, COINCENTER 
(Apr. 7, 2015), https://coincenter.org/entry/what-is-money-transmission-and-
why-does-it-matter (“The statutes are archaic. Many were conceived and drafted 
prior to the invention of the floppy disk, and were never intended to address 
anything more exotic than a wire transfer. The men who crafted these laws never 
considered that a computer could slip into a backpack, let alone store millions of 
dollars in convertible value.”). 
 180.  See supra Section III. 
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approach would ensure that the enacted regulatory framework 
specifically targets the benefits and dangers inherent in these emerging 
technologies without unduly stifling innovation. 
B. Clearly Define the Legislation’s Scope 
Legislation regulating virtual currency businesses should either 
clearly define the specific regulated activity or specify the entities that are 
required to obtain licenses. Legislators should avoid vague and 
undefined terms like “virtual currency business” and “virtual currency 
activity” that make a statute’s scope ambiguous. An overbroad and 
ambiguous scope could lead to unintended businesses being included in 
license regime, unnecessarily burdening startups with regulatory costs.  
Only businesses that have the potential to harm consumers because they 
manage consumer funds, such as exchanges or wallet services businesses, 
should be subject to licensure requirements. Entities such as 
cryptocurrency miners, mining pools without wallets, and software 
companies that develop blockchain-related software as a service pose no 
risk to consumers because they do not take possession of consumer funds 
and transmit them to others.  These types of businesses should be 
explicitly exempt from obtaining a license. 
C. Collaborate with Stakeholders 
Too often, regulators have hastily rushed to regulate virtual currency 
without fully understanding its unique characteristics or taking affected 
stakeholders into consideration. Instead of racing to regulation, 
regulators should collaborate with stakeholders in drafting and enacting 
virtual currency regulation. Compare how North Carolina and New York 
enacted their laws. North Carolina legislators worked directly with over 
twenty companies and six law firms before enacting its bill.181 As a result, 
the law was touted as being “business-friendly” and a “thoughtful 
approach to virtual currency regulation.”182 
New York’s BitLicense regime, on the other hand,  was unilaterally 
drafted by New York’s Department of Financial Services (NYDFS), an 
administrative agency, in only seven months, as opposed to going 
through the legislature.183 Although NYDFS Superintendent Benjamin 
 
 181.  Coleman, supra note 130. 
 182.  Lester Coleman, Bitcoin Advocates Weigh in on North Carolina Regulatory 
Bill, CCN (June 17, 2016), https://www.ccn.com/virtual-currency-advocates-
weigh-in-on-proposed-north-carolina-regulation/. 
 183.  Carlo C, NY State Releases “BitLicense” Regulations Draft for Businesses, 
COINTELEGRAPH (July 18, 2014), https://cointelegraph.com/news/ny-state-
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Lawsky intended to “strike an appropriate balance that helps protect 
consumers . . . without stifling beneficial innovation,”184 the BitLicense 
regime’s harsh requirements left the bitcoin community frustrated and 
resulted in a mass exodus of bitcoin businesses to more bitcoin-friendly 
states.185 To ensure a well-reasoned and balanced regulatory regime that 
attracts business and innovation, legislators must work alongside 
cryptocurrency experts and the business community. 
D. Include an On-Ramp 
Because the entities engaged in virtual currency-related business are 
often emerging startups with minimal funding, burdensome regulatory 
requirements could create barriers to entry to the virtual currency 
industry. Regulatory compliance costs have been estimated to equal 
approximately $176,000 upfront plus approximately $137,000 in annual 
fees.186 These figures do not include costs for determining whether 
regulations apply to the entity at all. Such extensive financial burdens are 
untenable for startups. 
Instead of imposing regulatory burdens upfront, startups should be 
exempt from regulation and licensing requirements until their 
transmission volumes reach a level at which significant consumer or 
systemic risk arises. Alternatively, the amount could be based on the total 
amount of consumer funds the entity controls at a certain point in time. 
Regardless, the amount should be high enough to exempt startups who 
pose little to no risk to the system or consumers in the event of their 
failure. This amount should also be specified by statute and not left to the 
discretion of an administrative agency. At most, start-ups can be required 
to disclose their transmission volumes to the licensing agency. 
The Uniform Regulation of Virtual Currency Businesses Act, a 
model statute drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws, allows for an exemption if a business is transacting 
less than $5000 annually187 and subjects a business with transaction 
 
releases-bitlicense-regulations-draft-for-businesses. 
 184.  Id. 
 185.  See Ogwu Osaemezu Emmanuel, New York Bitcoiners Move to Abolish 
Draconian BitLicense Regulation, BTC MANAGER (Feb. 26, 2018, 2:00 PM), 
https://btcmanager.com/new-york-bitcoiners-move-abolish-draconian-
bitlicense-regulation/ (“most . . . cryptocurrency-related firms are no longer 
active in New York City.”); Brennan, supra note 107. 
 186.  Grimes, supra note 142. 
 187.  UNIF. REGULATION OF VIRTUAL CURRENCY BUS. ACT § 103(b)(8) (NAT’L 
CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS. ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2017), http://www.uniformlaws 
.org/shared/docs/regulation%20of%20virtual%20currencies/2017AM_URVCB
A_AsApproved.pdf. 
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volumes less than $35,000 to light regulatory requirements that would be 
less than a full license.188 Conversely, Coin Center, a non-profit research 
and advocacy center that focuses on public policy issues facing virtual 
currencies,189 recommends that the amount be approximately 
$1,000,000.190 
 By explicitly exempting startups until their transmission volume 
or total amount under control reach levels that impose significant risks, 
emerging startups are incentivized to enter the market and are able to 
develop their technology without having to worry about complying with 
regulations. The on-ramp would protect consumers from high-volume 
virtual currency businesses while allowing promising lower-volume 
startups to innovate. 
E. Use Tiered Regulation to Tailor Regulation to Risk 
Once an entity’s transmission volume is high enough to enter the on-
ramp, regulatory requirements should be further tiered based on the 
entity’s transmission volume in order to tailor the level of regulation to 
the level of risk the entity imposes. Tailoring regulation to risk allows for 
startups with a lower ability to cause harm to be more leniently regulated 
while larger institutions with a propensity for greater harm to be more 
strictly regulated.  For example, North Carolina tailors its annual fee 
amount and surety bond amount to transmission volumes.191 Tiered 
regulation balances consumer protection with innovation by tailoring 
regulatory burdens to the amount of risk an entity poses. 
F. Require Only Relevant Information in the License Application 
License applications should only require information that is 
necessary to evaluate the applicants’ competency and ability to manage 
consumer funds. Requiring data such as the fingerprints and photographs 
of every employee who has access to consumer funds is both over-
intrusive and unnecessary. The philosophy underlying virtual currency 
is privacy and freedom from government control.192 Requiring such 
 
 188.  Id. § 210(a). 
 189.  About Us, COINCENTER, https://coincenter.org/about/ (last visited Oct. 
21, 2018). 
 190.  Valkenburgh & Brito, supra note 177, at 26-27. 
 191.  See supra notes 136–40 and accompanying text. 
 192.  See Eric Hughes, A Cypherpunk’s Manifesto, ACTIVISM.NET (Mar. 9, 1993), 
https://www.activism.net/cypherpunk/manifesto.html (“We cannot expect 
governments, corporations or other large, faceless organizations to grant us 
privacy out of their beneficence . . . . We are defending our privacy with 
cryptography . . . and with electronic money.”); see also Wei Dai, B-Money, WEI 
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obtrusive information may incentivize entrepreneurs and innovators to 
avoid providing its services within the state in order to maintain 
privacy.193 In fact, Satoshi Nakamoto himself, Bitcoin’s anonymous and 
mysterious creator, likely would never have sacrificed his privacy and 
anonymity for a bitcoin license.194 
G. Reduce Agency Discretion to Revoke Licenses 
Various statutes permit the agencies administering the statutes to 
revoke licenses if the agency head finds that certain conditions are met. 
However, many of the conditions specified in statutory language are 
broad and ambiguous, providing agencies overly broad discretion to 
revoke licenses and injecting uncertainty into the regulatory scheme. For 
example, New York’s BitLicense regime allows the superintendent to 
revoke a BitLicense “for good cause,” which is broadly defined as a 
showing that the licensee “has defaulted or is likely to default in 
performing its obligations. . . .”195 Likewise, Alaska’s proposed bill would 
allow the department to revoke a license if the licensee engages in an 
“unsafe or unsound practice,”196 which is defined as conduct that “creates 
the likelihood of material loss, insolvency, or dissipation of the . . . 
licensee’s assets, or otherwise materially prejudices the interests of the . . . 
licensee’s customers.”197 The Department is also allowed to consider the 
“magnitude of loss or potential loss.”198 
Such broad discretion creates uncertainty for regulated parties 
because almost any conduct can be said to create a likelihood of material 
loss or prejudice customers in some way. Agencies could revoke licenses 
from exchanges just because they list a virtual currency that is particularly 
volatile or because a listed cryptocurrency drops sharply in value on a 
 
DAI.COM (1998), http://www.weidai.com/bmoney.txt (“[I]n a crypto-anarchy the 
government is not temporarily destroyed but permanently forbidden and 
permanently unnecessary.”). 
 193.  See, e.g., Everett Rosenfeld, Company Leaves New York, Protesting ‘BitLicense’, 
CNBC (June 11, 2015 8:03 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2015/06/10/company-
leaves-new-york-protesting-bitlicense.html (showing that the cryptocurrency 
exchange ShapeShift left New York after the BitLicense because its CEO wanted 
to take a “moral and ethical stand” for privacy reasons). 
 194.  See Martin O’Leary, The Mysterious Disappearance of Satoshi Nakamoto, 
Founder & Creator of Bitcoin, LINKEDIN (Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.linkedin.com 
/pulse/mysterious-disappearance-satoshi-nakamoto-founder-creator-o-leary/ 
(stating that Satoshi Nakamoto was secretive and made sure not to reveal any 
personal details about himself to “retain[] his cloak of invisibility”). 
 195.  N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, § 200.6(c) (2015). 
 196.  ALASKA STAT. § 06.55.601(6) (2016). 
 197.  Section 06.55.990(24). 
 198.  H.B. 180, 30th Leg., 1st Sess. § 40 (Alaska 2017). 
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given day. Such ambiguous language creates vast uncertainty throughout 
the virtual currency industry within the state and leaves regulated entities 
with little guidance as to what conduct could lead to license revocation. 
Instead, statutes should confine agency discretion as much as 
possible. Legislators should include specific criteria for agencies to 
consider in determining whether to revoke a license and should include 
definitions of ambiguous words. Specificity would reduce industry 
uncertainty and lead to greater compliance with regulation as businesses 
would more clearly understand and avoid conduct that endangers their 
license. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Overall, the proposed amendments to Alaska’s Money Services Act 
would put the state on the strict end of the regulatory spectrum. HB 180’s 
vague scope, large surety bond amount, high annual assessment fees, and 
stringent annual report requirement could stifle innovation and deter 
cash-strapped tech startups from providing services or locating their 
businesses in Alaska. Alaska residents would miss out on the benefits that 
virtual currency technology provides. To avoid this undesirable outcome, 
Alaska legislators should follow the more flexible and lenient regulatory 
approach this Note recommends to balance consumer protection and the 
benefits of virtual currency innovation. 
 
